Minds At War: Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflicts of Defence Policy Makers (1988) By Steven Kull
 
Steven Kull is a political psychologist who studies public opinion on public policy. He has conducted polls and focus groups in over 30 countries around the world. He has led in-depth studies in the United States and the Muslim world, as well as numerous large multi-nation studies of world public opinion. Kull appears regularly in international media and has testified to or consulted with the U. S. Congress, the U. S. State Department, the United Nations, NATO, the European Commission, and other agencies. Kull is director of the Program for Public Consultation (PPC), part of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. PPC was established to develop the methods and theory of public consultation and to conduct public consultations. Kull is also Founder and President of Voice of the People (VOP), a nonpartisan organization that seeks to re-anchor the United States' democracy in its founding principles by giving 'We the People' a greater role in government. Kull graduated from the University of California in 1972 with a B.A. in Psychology and from the Saybrook Institute in 1980 with a Ph.D. in psychology. From 1984-1988 he was a post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University, studying international relations under the tutelage of Alexander George. The author, a psychologist, argues that even though it no longer serves to enhance national security, the psychological drive to compete, along with an often unconscious wish to suppress feelings of vulnerability, strongly influences strategic thinking. With the interviewing skills of a clinician and the political sophistication of an arms policy analyst, psychologist Steven Kull probes beyond published statements and beneath public posturing in his unusually candid face-to-face talks with high-level American strategic thinkers throughout the departments of Defense and State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, Congress, and Washington's influential defense think tanks, as well as with key Soviet diplomats and policy analysts. The author's penetrating questioning uncovers two streams--one of traditional thinking, the other for adaptation to nuclear reality==that shapes the visions of these leaders. He presents evidence that even though it no longer serves to enhance national security, the psychological drive to compete, along with an often unconscious wish to suppress feelings of vulnerability, strongly influences strategic thinking. These motivations are at odds with growing awareness and acceptance of nuclear reality. This work provides a unique view of the defense establishment through a revealing psychological lens. 
 
Hard Cover with Dust Jacket
341 pages
In Good Condition